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ABSTRACT
Political science explains various motives for political violence. This research
focuses on a particular kind of motivation: ethnicity. The 20th century has seen many
instances of ethnic violence, and this research seeks to understand why it occurs in one
place and time and not the other. Traditionally the literature on ethnic violence reflects on
economic conditions, regime type, geopolitics and historical context as significant
variables. This research posits that Kazakhstan managed to avoid ethnic violence because
it is more politically developed. The existence of an accommodative legislative assembly,
which assures the rights of ethnic minorities, is an example of Kazakhstan’s model of
ethnic inclusiveness and harmony. Such mechanisms are wholly absent in Azerbaijan,
despite immense oil wealth; it exhibits cases of extreme ethnic violence, terrorist
mobilization and threats to regime survival. Relatively politically developed states like
Kazakhstan are more inclined towards ethnic tolerance, inclusion & harmony, while
underdeveloped states lack the apparatus’ therein, resulting in exclusion and conflict. The
main implication of the research is that neither territorial disputes, nor resource curse nor
post-Soviet disintegration help to explain why ethnic conflict happens in one place,
Azerbaijan, and not in the other, Kazakhstan. There is however a positive relationship
between ethnic inclusion & ethnic harmony.
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INTRODUCTION
Research Question
This research is an attempt to answer the question of why ethnic conflict occurs is
some states and not others. In order to properly address the question, I’ve chosen a multimethod approach, including a logit regression as well as a comparative case study. I’ve
chosen two Caspian states, Kazakhstan & Azerbaijan, rich with oil. The Caspian Sea
region, or Central Asia rather, has become of growing importance, particularly since the
dissolution of the USSR, but even more so perhaps, following the rise in Islamic
fundamentalism. This has resulted in coordination between western and Caspian states
like Azerbaijan & Kazakhstan in security measures in attempt to prevent instability.
More importantly for this research, instability has also taken the form of ethnic
conflict, such as in the Caucasus, but also in CA states like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan &
Kirgizstan. Out of the CA states, only Kazakhstan has oil abundance, and is thus
vulnerable to the resource curse argument. That is Kazakhstan has averted any major
conflict or crises altogether through a rentier system (Franke et al 2009). To counter this
argument, and in order demonstrate that a lack of ethnic conflict (ethnic harmony) is not
caused by oil wealth but rather by institutional accommodation I compare Kazakhstan to
Azerbaijan.

Variables
In this research my aim is to demonstrate a relationship between the extent of
political development, indicated by the degree of ethnic inclusion, and the extent of
ethnic conflict, defined in the upcoming sections, exhibited in these two oil-rich post-
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Soviet, predominantly Muslim, Caspian & Turkic states. Beyond their security relevance,
Azerbaijan & Kazakhstan serve as prime examples of states with variance in ethnic
conflict and institutional development, despite the presence of oil in both states. I argue
that ethnically inclusive states are more likely to form institutions & legislate policies that
protect, preserve and encourage ethnic inclusion. As a result, they exhibit less ethnic
conflict. My independent variable is ethnic exclusion or inclusion; my dependent variable
is the degree of ethnic conflict or harmony – respectively. The research is organized into
the following sections respectively: introduction including research question and
variables as well as background history on the cases; followed by a literature review
including Wimmer et al’s regression results and implications; the main component which
is the comparative case study of minority conditions in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan; and
finally a conclusion.

Hypothesis
Inclusive states imbued with a resource curse are stable such as in Kazakhstan.
Exclusive states, can be unstable like Azerbaijan, which has exhibited ethnic cleansing
against Armenians, mass deportation of Kurds, terrorist attacks by dissident ethnic
militants like SADVAL, mass mobilization by Lezgin & Talysh populations, a coup
d’état & an ongoing war in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). Azerbaijan feels entitled to the
territory despite a population that is 98% Armenian, a sign of the ethnic exclusivist
character of the state.
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Case Selection
The history of the Caspian is rather unique, rich with a prevalence of tribalism,
nomadism, and clan relations. This was further enriched by the arrival of Islam, and the
legacy of imperial dominance by Russia & Iran. The USSR would eventually encompass
the entire region. It’s eventual collapse lead to the modern independent Kazakh &
Azerbaijani republics. The purpose of this segment is to demonstrate how these historical
similarities, while sharing some resemblance, do not ensure a shared degree of political
stability and ethnic harmony.
The history of the Caspian region as populated with nomadic, tribal people with
clan-based hierarchies greatly reflects in the political structures of the states therein.
Nomadism has played a huge role in the histories of both Kazakhstan & Azerbaijan. In
modern times, this is expressed through informal social institutions such as nepotism and
patronage. That these societies embrace informality arguably induces corruption. Neither
Kazakhstan nor Azerbaijan experienced autonomy until after the dissolution of the
USSR. Before the USSR, Kazakhstan was mainly under the auspices of Russia, and
Azerbaijan was ruled by Iran.
Traditionally, the influx of ideas, religions and cultures came along what is now
called the Silk Route, connecting the east and west through trade networks and other
forms of cultural interaction. Prior to the introduction of Islam by Arab warriors into the
region in the 8th century, the Caspian region exhibited a diverse religious demography,
including the mystical Shamanism, Tengrianism & Buddhism (Edelbay 2012).
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The integration of Azerbaijan & Kazakhstan into the USSR only reinforced the
tradition of authoritarianism and the centralization of power. They have carried on even
into the post-soviet era (Tokaev 2004).
The disintegration of the USSR produced a vacuum of power. This vacuum was
either to be filled by extremists or a continued legacy of authoritarianism. Kazakhstan &
Azerbaijan, like most Caspian states, chose the latter. Similar security measures to the
USSR were adopted, continuing the legacy of Soviet-inspired police-state. The only
difference was that Moscow had essentially less control over the region it once easily
swallowed up.
Azerbaijan & Kazakhstan also share linguistic roots. Both languages are Turkic in
origin. This renders them an even more ideal comparison. Perhaps most importantly of all
commonalities – both states are among the top twenty-five oil-exporters in the world.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Theory
To understand the relationship between ethnic conflict and exclusion, it is
important to define four major concepts in this research: Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict,
Ethnic Exclusion (discrimination) & Ethnic Inclusion.
Ethnicity is defined as “subjective experienced sense of commonality based on
belief in a common ancestry and shared culture. Indicators of common ancestry and
culture include common language, phenotypical features, and belonging to same faith
(Wimmer et al 2009).
Ethnic conflict is described as mass violence between two communities that each
belongs to a distinct cultural group with common heritage and other subjective
commonalities. In order to be classified as an ethnic conflict, armed organizations must
seek to achieve “ethnonationalist aims, motivations & interests and recruit fighters and
forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations” (Wimmer et al 2009). Ethnic conflicts
are distinct in their “armed organization, recruitment and alliance structures. In other
words, ethnic conflicts are typically fought over ethnonational self-determination, ethnic
balance of power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and racial
discrimination, and language and other cultural rights” (Sambanis).
In many cases, antagonist ethnic groups will not be able to agree on new
constitutional arrangements or a peaceful separation. These kind of ethnic disputes
consequently become violent, some escalate into all-out inter-ethnic war. This is the
situation in Angola, Kashmir, Shi Lanka, Bosnia, and Caucasus. Some scholars explain
reasons of ethnic conflicts with collapse of the authoritarian rule. As an example, the
5

main reason why ethnic conflicts have sprung up in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and elsewhere, because the authoritarian rule has collapsed and made such
conflicts possible. This is the conventional wisdom. This argument ignores other
potential causes of ethnic conflicts. It remains a daunting task to explain why ethnic
conflicts have broken out in some places, but not others, and why some ethnic conflicts
are more violent than others (Ismayilov 2008).
To elaborate further, ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts between ethnic
groups within a multi-ethnic state, which have been going on some time, which may
appear to be unsolvable to the parties caught up in them. An ethnic conflict is a dispute
about important political, economic, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more
ethnic communities (Brown 1993). The most distinct feature of ethnic conflict is the
explicit targeting of a group on the basis of a shared culture (Wimmer et al 2009). It is a
long lasting tension between two groups that wish to advance their interests (Ismayilov
2008). In non-ethnic conflict, members of the same ethnic group might be in conflict,
whereas ethnic conflict is distinctly between two separate groups on the basis of their
subjective cultural differences and the political implications therein. As the literature
indicates, as with many abstract political concepts, there is little consensus on the
definition of ethnicity. The use of ‘subjective’ is to indicate the ‘ambiguity’ of the
definition. In Lebanon for example the political system is known as consociationalism, in
which religion is deeply tied to ideology and ethnicity, thus making it difficult to really
distinguish any ethnic group.
It is also important to define ethnic exclusion, or discrimination rather, so as to
demonstrate how this exclusion is being gauged. Members of an ethnic group that are
6

excluded from government or discriminated against are subject to intentional, targeted
disenfranchisement. Discrimination entails limiting access to government positions to
citizens who speak a certain language, exhibit phenotypical features or members of a
particular faith. Discrimination can be informal too, that is – it can exist without legal
enforcement, if a society actively prevents a particular ethnic group from mobilizing in
that society (Tescur & Gurses 2017). An example of ethnic exclusion or discrimination
includes African-Americans until the civil rights movement. Some might argue that
informal discrimination persists today (Wynne 2004).
On the other hand, inclusion can be described as institutional accommodation,
beyond nominal laws, intended to help raise social status and political representation
levels of ethnic minorities. The Civil Rights Act of 1995 & Affirmative Action are two
examples of such accommodations in the US (Wynne 2004).
Inclusion is a key concept in this article, particularly because I focus on
Kazakhstan’s unique institutional infrastructure, the APK, which reduces the risk of
ethnic conflict. The theoretical basis of my argument on the positive relationship between
ethnic inclusion and ethnic conflict draws from Wimmer’s Model of Ethnic Inclusion
(Wimmer, Cederman, & Min. 2009). Wimmer’s model suggests that ethnic inclusion
does reduce the chances of ethnic conflict, but that this inclusion must go beyond mere
laws. In other words, institutions and policies must be in practice that wholly address and
accommodate the needs of ethnic minorities based on their experiences in given states
(Wimmer et al 2009).
Ethnic conflicts occur in a multi-ethnic state, have been going on some time, and
appear to be difficult to resolve. An ethnic conflict is a disagreement about political,
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economic, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities (Brown
1993).
The most distinct feature of ethnic conflict is the explicit targeting of a group on
the basis of a shared culture (Wimmer et al 2009). It is a long lasting tension between two
groups that wish to advance their interests (Ismayilov 2005). In non-ethnic conflict,
members of the same ethnic group might be in conflict, whereas ethnic conflict is
distinctly between two separate groups on the basis of their subjective cultural differences
and the political implications therein. As the literature indicates, as with many abstract
political concepts, there is little consensus on the definition of ethnicity. The use of
‘subjective’ is to indicate the ‘ambiguity’ of the definition. In Lebanon for example the
political system is known as confessionalism, in which religion is deeply tied to ideology
and ethnicity, thus making it difficult to really distinguish any ethnic group.
The literature is vast on ethnic conflict, but there is almost no focus on the
relationship between ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict (Edelbay 2012). Instead most
researchers focus on secessionist movements or insurgencies, but not on mere violent
clashes, pogroms, and massacres. Furthermore, the literature suggests that most ethnic
conflict is the result of collapsing authoritarian regimes, but this does not account for the
occurrence of ethnic conflict in one region, and not the other (Ismayilov 2005).
The emergence of ethnic nationalism, such as in Azerbaijan, makes ethnic conflict
much more likely. The rise of ethnic nationalism in one group can be seen as threatening
by others. But even Kazakhstan, and most other post-soviet states exhibited high rates of
nationalism for the sake of nation building. The mere disintegration of the authoritarian,
cross-national empire of the USSR left a vacuum of power and the need for new states to
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emerge and address collective political needs. Not all states exhibited the same degree of
nationalism. There is a distinction between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in this regard.
Neither country is democratic by any means, but Kazakhstan has clear institutional
differences in terms of ethnic minority inclusion. So what is this difference? A degree of
political development, or institutionalized representation and inclusion has the potential
to help mitigate ethnic tension by allowing for the establishment of an inclusive means of
governance to address the needs of all ethnic groups in the state. This inclusiveness goes
beyond just mere protection of minorities but accommodates and addresses grievances
(Porter 2003). Now that we understand these important concepts and their definitions, of
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, and the various sources of dispute, and expression of
grievances, we can apply this reasoning to the two cases. I’ll begin first with Kazakhstan
followed by an assessment of its ethnic harmony and the presence of robust institutions
that enable it, followed by a section on ethnic exclusion, discrimination & ethnic conflict.
Before the data section, it is imperative to understand the importance of
controlling for resource curse (oil abundance), soviet past & religiosity in order to
demonstrate the relationship between ethnic exclusion and violence. Resource curse can
be defined as a state imbued with abundant natural resources that tilt the political
spectrum economically, often leading governments towards the fate of the rentier state,
where resources – instead of accountability – are managed to clients in order to secure
power, appease and stabilize society (Watts 2004). Wimmer & Cederman account for all
of these control variables in their research design, including also imperial (soviet) legacy,
homogeneity (linguistic fractionalization) & secessionist movements, through a logistic
regression of 192 countries (Fearon 2003).
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Data
This section illustrates with the use of two major databases focusing on ethnic
minorities the relationship between inclusion and stability. The first set is UNPO and it
demonstrates 33 cases of ethnic exclusion across the globe. These cases help to
contextualize the dynamics of each state within each ethnic conflict & exclusion occurs,
by comparing levels of oil wealth, imperial past, conflict & inclusion. Two of these cases,
are the Talysh & Lezgin in Azerbaijan.
The second database Ethnic Power Relations, which is broader with a sample size
of 157, illustrates through a logistic regression the relationship between ethnic exclusion
and violence by controlling for variables like oil, colonialism, and geography. These
databases serve to complement & reinforce my hypotheses, which are listed below.
Most oil rich states are stable but not enough to deem it a significant variable,
given forty percent of oil rich countries remain unstable, throughout the second half the
twentieth century, experienced much violence. This includes Nigeria, Venezuela &
Libya.
Ethnic Power Relations 3.0 is a dataset that demonstrates the relationship between
ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict. The dataset identifies 150 politically relevant ethnic
groups and their access to state power between the years 1946-2010. The dataset includes
157 countries and 758 ethnic groups, and measures the degree of exclusion from
government ranging from total representation to over discrimination. Regression results
demonstrate that changes in exclusion of ethnic groups produces the greatest increase in
the risk of ethnic conflict.
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Variables such as oil abundance, imperial past, ongoing war nor secessionist
movements have an effect as statistically significant on ethnic conflict as the variable of
ethnic exclusion. In other words, neither oil wealth, the USSR’s legacy of imperialism in
the Caspian region nor the Nagorno-Karabakh War are as statistically significant in their
overall influence on ethnic conflict as one might expect. The same logic applies to oil
curse, secessionist movements, homogeneity, imperial past or religiosity. The data
indicates that none of these intervening variables are anywhere near as significant as
ethnic exclusion in its relationship to conflict.
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KAZAKHSTAN
Political Structure
The political stability of Kazakhstan cannot be understood without analysis of its
political structure and process. In this section I argue that the internal politics of
Kazakhstan, while negatively affecting its stability, due to corruption, fraudulent
elections and opposition suppression, is also a source of stability with regards to the
strength of the state and its overall legislative structure. Of the eight variables, only
political development and economic conditions pose a challenge in analysis. In a sense,
both the endurance of the state, and the vast endowment of oil, which I discuss in the
economic section, are a “gift and a curse”. While the political development of
Kazakhstan shares a negative relationship with its political stability, it arguably serves as
a window of hope for its future, noting its resilience in the face of radicalism and foreign
pressure. Still, recent legislation passed by parliament has abolished executive term limits
for President Nazarbayev, securing his role as leader of Kazakhstan for life. This dims the
hopes for democratic reform. Furthermore it underscores the urgency of an impending
succession crisis.
Kazakhstan is a unitary republic, with its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, as the
head of state. Legislative powers reside in a bicameral legislature, with includes the
Majlis, the upper house and the senate, the lower house (Popjanevski 2006). Political
parties are allowed to compete, but the authenticity of the election process is challenged
by internal and external sources (Kendall-Taylor 2012). Some parties however are
deemed illegal, wholly banned and actively suppressed (Popjanevski 2006). Neither of
the opposition parties possesses enough support or power to pose a significant threat in
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the election process. Furthermore, private media is largely suppressed, with the majority
of publications being in support of the current administration. This is telling of the
credibility and reputation of the constitution of Kazakhstan, which nominally protects
private media — nominally.
Kazakhstan’s leadership under President Nazarbayev has been remarkably
effective in stabilizing the country. It has endured less attacks and Nazarbayev has done
well to smear his opponents as “gangsters and criminals” (Wynne 2004). He has
displayed his effectiveness in maintaining a steady economy, while appeasing both his
Russia, American, and Chinese counterparts, in what has been deemed a “multi-vector
foreign policy” (Sambanis).
Kazakhstan has made many strides with regards to political reform, but it has also
been guilty of backpedaling (Oka 2009). Nonetheless, with careful consideration of the
diverse forces forming the political fabric of Kazakhstan, there is reason to believe that
its successes are equally worthy of attention as its shortcomings. Key points must be
considered in order to clearly understand why the country’s progress towards democracy
has lagged and been the subject of criticism. Since Kazakhstan is a newly independent
republic, it must be taken into consideration that comparing its degree of ethnic inclusion
may not be as sophisticated as provisions for minority rights in western liberal
democracies, however imperfect they may be.
In context, compared to its neighbors, especially Uzbekistan, it has undoubtedly
surpassed them in terms of stability and progress (Rezvani 2008). Research indicates
unprecedented civic activism and voter turn-out rates in Kazakhstan’s presidential
elections. That being said, opposition parties are largely disenfranchised and discouraged
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from participating in the political process, often echoing accusations of fraudulent
elections (Fearon et al 2003). In this regard, Kazakhstan’s leadership has been able to
deploy the rentier mechanism by which political reform is substituted with public
services funded by oil-wealth. The immense importance of the role played by oil in
shaping the political dynamic of Kazakhstan can thus not be ignored, because it the
source of much of the tension that exists between the various domestic forces competing
for power and foreign political forces influencing Kazakhstan’s political stability.
The persistence of the authoritarian model of governance in Kazakhstan is
arguably a product of President Nazarbayev’s initiative to secure his power for life. Both
houses of the parliament voted to abolish his executive term limit, thus sidestepping the
2017 presidential election – an exception made only for Nazarbayev. Future leaders
would have to abide by the original two-term limit. Despite the face of modern
Kazakhstan, this is largely considered another step away from democracy. Furthermore it
underscores the succession crisis faced in the country. How can Nazarbayev’s reputation
as stabilizer, modernizer and developer be reconciled with his tainted legacy of
crackdowns, corruption scandals and cult-like rule? In reality it cannot, but the presence
of foreign powers in the region, as well as the early stages of political development
within which Kazakhstan currently finds itself in a post-Soviet world, should make critics
of Nazarbayev more considerate of the political dynamic. There is reason to believe that
while Kazakhstan has been characterized by relative stability, Nazarbayev’s policies
might incite terror and conflict in the long run, as is evidenced by sporadic cases of
violence today. The presence of a robust, internationally supported security apparatus has
perpetuated political underdevelopment, but the hand played by the West, in its
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oxymoronic mission of simultaneously promoting security and democracy, cannot be
overlooked. Therefore another likely scenario might trace Kazakhstan’s reluctance
towards democracy to the stubbornness on the part of both domestic political elites and
global powers, like Russia, Europe, China & the US. Furthermore, how can the
promotion of democracy and a robust security initiative be reconciled if the strategy is
contradictory and counterintuitive? It appears that prospects for democracy are threatened
equally by Nazarbayev’s grip on power as much as by foreign meddling and terrorism,
together. From this regard, Nazarbayev appears to be more of a pragmatic ruler, who
compared to his peers, performed effectively in ensuring Kazakhstan’s development and
stability. This is an impressive feat as it was accomplished in the face of competing
forces for power. It suggests that Nazarbayev’s power-hunger might have more to do
with resisting subjugation to foreign powers, which might be detrimental to Kazakhstan
as a whole, than it does with his own self. Seeing that foreign powers do in fact benefit
from the persistence of authoritarianism, it appears that promoting democracy is not in
their best interests, which raises the question of legitimacy of both the West’s double
standard as well as the institution of democracy itself. Both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs
have viewed Nazarbayev as the harbinger of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, which has
propped him up politically. Perhaps if foreign powers exercised less coercion over the
region, democratic movements might be more possible, reducing the allure of both
authoritarianism and radicalism. Equally if Kazakhstan exhibited democratic institutions
like term limits, free speech, political competitiveness, fair elections and civil liberties
wholly, the country might be less imbalanced politically, socially and economically.
More importantly, it might be less subservient to foreign pressures because in democracy
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a leader draws legitimacy from his constituents, not by accommodating foreign powers,
as exhibited in Kyrgyzstan following the civil war and the institution of democracy. In
revealing the complicity of the US, leader of the democratic world, in helping
authoritarians, raises questions about the West’s intention, but also about the nature of
democracy itself. It might be a stretch to suggest that democracy is either slipping or
unattained in the US even. Authoritarianism is not entirely absent from American history
therefore allying with authoritarians is not completely surprising, whether it is
cooperating with authoritarian governments of Russia or Kazakhstan.
Tensions in Kazakhstan’s domestic politics—whether they are between members
of the political elite, or between the political elite and the mass—have often been the
subject of exploitation by global powers, using the fragility of the region to their own
advantage. This leads us directly to the next variable.
In the realm of foreign politics, Kazakhstan is a key player in “The New Great
Game” (Oka 2004). Russia is arguably the greatest threat to Kazakhstan’s political
stability. Managing the longest contiguous border in the world, Kazakhstan’s leadership
perpetually fends itself against the threat of Russian imposition (Country Reports 2015).
However the US has also played an influential role in this regard. As global hegemonies
play tug-o-war over the region, it becomes more apparent that its foreign relations share a
negative relationship with Kazakhstan’s political stability.
Statements made by Vladimir Putin at the Selinger Youth Camp in 2014 reveal
Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Russian domination, especially with a significant Russian
population living in mainly Northern Kazakhstan. The Georgian and Ukrainian crises,
and Russia’s post-soviet neo-imperialism tradition, have done nothing to mitigate Kazakh
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fears of Russian influence (Nyussupova 2011). The threat of Russian separatism
emanates from the Northern Kazakhstan Province (De Waal 2007). For this reason,
Nazarbayev moved the capital of Kazakhstan from Almaty to Astana, which is along the
Northern border, closer to Russia (Oka 2004). An act of defiance against Russian
hegemony, Nazarbayev further proved himself a prolific player in the great game.
Russia’s proximity to Kazakhstan has served as somewhat of a double-edged
sword. Despite the constant fear of Russian imposition, President Nazarbayev has utilized
his close relationship with Russia as a means of resisting western influence, namely
pressure from the US for democratic reform. Nazarbayev has lifted term limits on
executive leadership and a lack of political development prevents power sharing and
encourages corruption. In another sense however this close relationship with Russia is a
way of preserving both Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty in the face of what is
perceived to be western imperialism. Not only does it help to keep Nazarbayev in power,
it prevents the West from being the arbiter of the East. Equally, Nazarbayev’s flirtatious
relationship with Russia can be viewed as an attempt to solidify his rule and establish a
so-called pro-Russian nationalist dictatorship for life. Criticism of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization as a multinational means of preserving autocracy in the region
echoes this sentiment.
On the other end of the foreign political dynamic rests Kazakhstan's intimate
economic relationship with the US. Nonetheless, by associating demands for democracy
with neocolonialism, Nazarbayev has legitimized his ideology. By balancing the
priorities autonomy, growth and stability, he has solidified what has been coined as his
“multi-vector-foreign policy” (De Waal 2007). That he has maintained Kazakhstan's
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independence, autonomy, and economic progress, has further legitimized his position.
But Russian hegemony is nothing new to the Central Asian giant; as the stains of
Imperial Russia surely remain engrained in the memories of Kazakhs (Karin et al 2002).
But the demise of the USSR has essentially opened a vacuum of power it could be
argued. The world, having transitioned from a bipolar to a unipolar political dynamic,
with the US essentially having grip on global power, has essentially allowed the US to
reign in on the region’s vulnerability and economic appeal.
Like its eastern counterparts, the West, namely the US, has simultaneously played
an inconsistent role in the region; often indirectly propping up extremists, neglecting
delayed reforms, and dipping their hands in scandalous oil politics. Despite prodemocratic rhetoric, it seems neither of the global hegemons, Russia, China nor the US,
are genuinely committed to a “democratic process” in Kazakhstan. This factor is perhaps
the most overlooked in current literature on political stability in Central Asia (Oka 2004).
With regards to its regional and local allies, Kazakhstan has maintained a positive
relationship for the most part. The greatest threat to its stability comes from its
relationship with the global powers of Russia, China, the US and the EU, who have
engaged in double-dealings, policy inconsistency and moral negligence. Kazakhstan
enjoys a positive reputation among international organizations, especially the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, or SCO, of which it was a founding member (Ulasiuk 2013).
Nonetheless, it faces continued scrutiny over the process of its elections and accounts of
corruption various international organizations, despite being an active member of the U.N
(Wimmer et al 2009).
The SCO however has played a more direct role in the region. On one hand, it has
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served a stabilizing force, enabling coordinated security efforts, economic fluidity and
immigration. Furthermore, it has counterbalanced European and American influence in
the region, which may or may not serve the overall security interests of the region. But
considering sovereignty as a crucial variable for stability, it would appear that the SCO
serves this purpose effectively. On the other hand, the SCO has strengthened the grasp of
autocratic regimes, raising the question as to whether international organizations promote
or discourage democratization. Equally such criticism may be premature considering the
region is still newly independent & the republics newly formed.
In 2008, Russia annexed South Ossetia from Georgia, prompting international
ridicule and fears of a reemerging Cold War. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014,
following with the annexation of Crimea and Abkhazia, these fears seemed almost
perfectly vindicated. While such aggression by Russia is unsurprisingly of alarm to the
international community and particularly the West, the actions themselves must be of
little surprise, that is – if one is to look through the lens of Moscow’s leadership.
Expanding NATO global operations as well as increased US military involvement in the
Middle East, prompted fears of a Western encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence.
From this angle, it might be less difficult to grasp the motives for Russia’s behavior in the
past five years.
This segment of the research is of particular importance as I argue later in the
paper, it is the most crucial variable in the relationship with political stability. The threat
of Islamic fundamentalism is perhaps the greatest security issue for Kazakhstan. The
threat of Russian separatism, though very real, especially following the Georgian and
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Ukrainian crises, has been thus far contained. In this section I demonstrate how the
security and military condition of Kazakhstan has made it less stable.
National security poses a very unique challenge for Kazakhstan. However
Kazakhstan has been essentially able to mitigate the threat relative to its neighbors. The
threat is both foreign and domestic, with large swaths of ideological fanaticism being
imported from abroad, mainly from Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, in the form of
Wahhabism (Kleveman 2003). Kazakhstan has remained stable despite the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in Central Asia. Repressive retaliation by Central Asian governments has
only aggravated the situation. Various influential terrorist and extremist networks operate
in the region, such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic
Jihad Union, Soldiers of the Caliphate, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
(Edelbay 2012). There also exists a threat from Uyghur separatist groups within
Kazakhstan as well as a threat from external sources of radicalization emanating
primarily from the Middle East (De Waal 2007). These forces altogether represent
obstacles to Kazakhstan’s national security, which is evidently a significant factor of
consideration in the political stability of Kazakhstan. They suggest another reason why
democratic reform has lagged. Furthermore, they focus attention on the authoritarian
nature of the regime, and the relationship of that authoritarianism with the rise of
dissenting groups of radical Islamic persuasion. On the other hand, the existence of these
extremist networks is perhaps another reason why Nazarbayev has been able to maintain
power—by portraying himself as a champion of the cause against terrorism, he has
garnered immense support from the U.S. and has replaced Uzbekistan as Central Asia’s
primary force against Islamic fundamentalism (Franke et al 2009). These forces also
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underscore the immense responsibility bestowed on the government of Kazakhstan in
balancing the agendas of all power players and potential threats to Kazakh stability and
autonomy. Since the inception of the post 9/11 era, and the ensuing “War on Terror” as
led by the US, there has been little success in mitigating the overall threat of terrorism in
the region, further underscoring the need for reconsidering policy measures (Country
Reports 2015).
It becomes uniquely difficult to isolate the security threat from the other variables.
There have been instances in which groups like the IMU have engaged with global
hegemonies directly and indirectly (Oka 2004). If this is true, it could be argued that
religious radicalism is exploited by foreign powers as means of destabilization.
In sum, there is a negative relationship between the security conditions of
Kazakhstan and its overall political stability. Despite its leader’s attempts to mitigate the
threat compared to his neighbors, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the threat
remains. Since 2011, there has yet to be an attack (Markedonov & Sergey 2009).
Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s military has been relatively dormant in terms of full-fledged
combat. This is a signal of its relative stability compared to its Central Asian neighbors.
Kazakhstan’s political structure is developed but constitutional provisions are
mainly nominal, and power is centralized economically and politically. The press enjoys
relative freedom, but this is counterbalanced by clan based politics, a dominant ruling
party, and questionably fake elections. Still, Kazakhstan unlike its Caspian counterpart
experienced no war or coup, no ethnic cleansing, or ethnic tension since the dissolution of
the USSR, amidst rampant territorial conflict in Central Asia. The APK enables the
authoritarian system to endure longer and be more stable by providing more
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representation for minorities. This results in ethnic harmony because ethnic minorities are
able to preserve language and identity while gaining a proportionate number of seats in
the legislature. Currently there is no active ethnic conflict, tension or movement in
Kazakhstan, although every now and then demonstrators are arrested for protesting one
party rule. Kazakhstan enjoys more autonomy due to its accountability at home. While it
is influenced by Russia, this influence is not as forceful as it is in Azerbaijan. Turkey also
heavily influences Azerbaijan. This is possible, I argue mainly because it is less
politically developed. This leads to more ethnic conflict and renders the state vulnerable
to pressures from foreign powers. It appears that the political culture of Kazakhstan made
a cognitive choice to be more tolerant. While it is far from perfect, these qualities render
Kazakhstan’s future more promising than its neighbors. While Azerbaijan could have
used oil as a means of stability, the state reacted to the dissolution of the USSR
desperately and centralized far too much power at expense of ethnic minority rights.
Ethnic equality gives leverage to Kazakhstan to depend on accountability at home (albeit
imperfect) instead of arbitrary foreign lobbies & ethnocentric authoritarianism.
Immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union, Kazakhstan conducted one of the
most effective reforms among the countries of the current Commonwealth of Independent
States. This included price liberalization, reductions in trade distortions, privatization of
small and medium-sized enterprises, and improvements in budget and treasury processes.
This resulted in rapid economic growth (Jalles 2011).
In Kazakhstan there is a connection between the autocratic regime, rentierism,
and “pre- and post-Soviet habits and legacies”. Post-communist methods of control over
society at large, the restriction of basic political rights, are still entrenched deeply,
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because of the financial ‘benefits’ of the rentier system in a resource curse state but also
the constructs of political, & social disenfranchisement (Franke et al 2009).
Unlike the majority of post-communist states, Kazakhstan achieved independence
rather smoothly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has often been described as
an ‘accidental country’ (Mateeva 1997). The formation of the first independent Republic
of Kazakhstan occurred without any interruptions and general split with the incumbent
Soviet government. The first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Nursultan
Nazarbayev, was immediately elected – or reinstated rather – practically automatically, as
the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in December 1991 remains in power
today. Many members of the staff of the Central Committee of the KCP in 1991 have
also remained in positions of power. This is neo-Communism. The new USSR if you will
(Franke et al 2009).
Initially Kazakhstan could be seen as a parliamentary democracy based on its first
constitution, but this was interrupted by the suspension of democratic, parliamentary
reforms. The 1990s saw a regression to authoritarianism. “For the most part, this failed
transition has been internationally tolerated for economic reasons” (Franke et al 2009).
The autocratic structure provided a stable political environment, necessary to attract
foreign investment. The Kazakh elite quickly learned that liberal democracies like the US
& those in Europe were superficial in their insistence on human rights and democracy,
since no sanctions against the state were taken (Kendall-Taylor 2012).
In 1995, significant changes were made to constitution rendering Kazakhstan a
full fledged presidential autocracy. All authority of the state rests with the president, who
is not accountable to any legitimate electorate or authority. Impeachment is possible
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through but not likely. The term of the government end coincides with the president. He
can dismiss or appoint a new government at his discretion, as he pleases, demonstrating
the weakness of the opposition and the lack of a separation of powers. The parliament
exhibits two chambers and is a directly elected body. But it has no authority to challenge
the president’s authority. Nazarbayev and his political party have governed without any
democratic checks, hence the absence of a separation of powers & checks & balances.
Not a single opposition party member occupies a seat in parliament. The legislative
branch—the parliament and the local legislatures—are unable to challenge his authority.
Loyal mayors, governors and governmental elites have secured power. Political
development has many dimensions, so while Kazakhstan & Azerbaijan are distinct in
their institutional accommodations for ethnic minorities, they share a similar trend of
deeply entrenched authoritarianism.
Surrounding Nazarbayev exists a network of power comprising of his family and
a smaller group of political allies. Nazarbayev’s elder daughter essentially controls the
Kazakh media. The president’s younger daughter controls the construction, water and gas
industries. Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law controls the food industry, security, taxation
(as head of Almaty’s Taxation department) and the position of deputy foreign minister,
ambassador to Austria and to the OSCE. Nazarbayev’s new son in law has been
appointed head of energy, dealing with oil, which is the most influential sector.
Nazarbayev has no sons, thus his daughters and sons-in-law shape the structures around
him. The most influential and wealthiest women in Kazakhstan are the first lady, and her
two daughters. This family network creates a neo-patrimonial system based on trust, kinship &
interests (Franke et al 2009)

24

Like The Sopranos™, the Kazakh regime and its inner-circle is referred to a “the
Family”. Approval of political action is at the discretion of ‘the Family’. This method of
control is a means of securing loyalty, perpetuating patronage and clientelism. Despite its
diversity, Kazakhstan exhibits a “pyramid of elites”, which is, furthermore, embodied by
a robust ethnocentric tradition (Franke et al 2009). At the top sits the president and his
family and his most immediate ‘clientele’, “followed by the administrative tier”, whose
jobs are mainly occupied by Kazakhs instead of Russians. And yet amidst this
ethnocentrism favoritism Kazakh elites are not monolithic and often exhibit tensions and
competition amongst each other. Personal interests take precedence, rendering policy
ineffective and absent (Mateeva 1997).
The party system in Kazakhstan is weak and scattered; it is personalistic and is
lacks a real mechanism for application of platforms. There is no party system with
oppositional structures, similar to those found in other post-communist states. Kazakh
opposition parties are subject to permanent repression, rendering programs and policy
obsolete & futile. Attempts have been made to create competition among elites during the
parliamentary elections of 2004 and 2007, as well as the presidential election of 2005,
which were considered by observers as unfree and unfair, but there remains no alternative
to the Nazarbayev’s rule & whatever direction is successor goes (Franke et al 2009).
The political elite in Kazakhstan can be grouped into two categories. On one side,
there exists the traditional order of the horde, which depends on genealogical seniority
and size manifested as clan based politics. On the other hand is a strongly entrenched and
developed system, which are basically the remnants of the Communist Party, the former
USSR’s economic structures and emerging business elites. These so-called business clans
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have become institutionalized as personalized parties and oligarchic groups (Franke et al
2009).

Ethnic Inclusion & Harmony
In Kazakhstan, this accommodation exists via the establishment and continued
involvement and development of the People’s Assembly of Kazakhstan or APK.
Prominent ethnic groups include Uzbeks, Tatars, Uighurs, Chechens, Koreans,
Turks, Azerbaijanis and Germans (Nyussupova 2011). Kazakhs make up 65%, Russians
21.5%, Uzbeks 3%, Ukrainians 1.8%, Uyghurs 1.4%, Tatars 1.2% & Germans 1.1%.
There are many others, as Kazakhstan boasts 120 various ethnic groups, but their
numbers are drastically smaller.
It is important to note that the population of Russians is the second largest. Before
independence, Kazakhstan’s own national ethnic group, the Kazakhs, comprised less than
40% of the total population. During this time Russian was more widely spoken.
Following independence however, Kazakh was nationalized as the official language.
Furthermore, quite recently, Kazakh’s became the official ethnic majority within their
own national boundaries for the first time in their history (13).
To highlight the significance of demography, the presence of Uzbeks in southern
Kazakhstan provide insight into the assertion that modern Central Asia is an artificial
creation traced back to the initial “cutting up” of the region by USSR leaders. It is likely
that the environment and conditions created by these “partitions” created much of the
imbalance and instability in the region today. Despite being Uzbek by ethnicity, Kazakh
Uzbeks are loyal to the soil in which they have inhabited for centuries. That ethnic
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irredentism really highlights the role of the New Great Game in determining the overall
demographic structure and dynamic of Kazakhstan, and Central Asia altogether (Oka
2009). Uzbeks are currently satisfied with their political condition in Kazakhstan no and
are unlikely to mobilize against the state or make nationalist demands.
Relative to his Central Asian neighbors, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has
witnessed under his rule a relatively stable and harmonious interethnic relationship in his
country. This is most likely attributed to Kazakhstan’s overall moderate approach to
policy, which sees a balancing of foreign, domestic, and minority interests, contrary to
Ilham Aliyev’s cult-like rule in Azerbaijan.
Nazarbayev rules with more pragmatism. Kazakhstan has witnessed no significant
episodes of violent deteriorations of society.
More importantly perhaps, is how Nazarbayev’s vision of stability and harmony
expressed itself domestically. Through the establishment of the People’s Assembly of
Kazakhstan in 1995, ethnic minorities are represented in this legislative body, which is
intended to protect, preserve and celebrate their rights as well as the ethnic pluralism,
which defines Kazakhstan. The APK (Assembly of People of Kazakhstan) consists of
384 representatives of all ethnic groups in the state (Jones 2010). The APK elects nine
members to the Majlis; Kazakhstan’s lower-chamber of Parliament. Finally, all laws
passed by the legislature must meet a certain criteria ensuring ethnic harmony, a
significant check on executive power protecting ethnic minorities. Everything is at the
discretion of the President – yet these provisions are wholly absent in Azerbaijan
implying they do in fact limit the executive’s power over minorities.
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Kazakhstan has successfully employed national efforts to promote cultural tolerance
and cohesiveness through its making of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. National
efforts to promote cultural/ethnic tolerance include: insuring each ethnic group has a
voice within the government through policies, organizations, assemblies etc., granting all
minorities equal rights and representation within the country, not using ethnicity as a tool
for political mobilization but instead creating a “national identity” for everyone to be
apart of equally (one that does not have to do with ethnic background at all but rather
being a citizen of the said country), creating equal opportunities in the business realm for
all ethnic groups, instilling strict laws against ethnic discrimination even down to ethnic
slurs, as well as promoting peace through cultural events, parades, and the alike. The
APK exemplifies directly national efforts in promoting cultural/ethnic tolerance and
cohesiveness. Contrarily Azerbaijan exhibits paranoia towards the idea of political
representation of minorities as this threatens the ethnocentric character of the incumbent
regime. Is must be noted that the previous regime had in place proportionate rule in
government. This was removed by the current administration.
It has become evident that Kazakhstan’s politicians are aware of the need for
inter-ethnic accord, in order to maintain political stability. Institutionally, Kazakhstan’s
laws prevented the formation of political parties along ethnic lines; instead, in 1995 – by
order of executive decree, President Nursultan Nazarbayev established the Assembly of
the People of Kazakhstan in March 1995, a legislative and presidential consultative body,
largely touted by Kazakh officials as a representation of the nation’s progressive policies.
Ultimately though, the APK has served mainly as a means for controlling ethnic
minorities and securing a national Kazakh identity. This was underscored by the APK’s
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name-change, which was meant to signify its purpose as a unifying project. In other
words, while the mission is to encourage harmony between ethnicities; the more
underlying purpose is the stabilization of society under a unifying Kazakh identity. While
ethnicities are preserved, minorities are simultaneously proud of their Kazakh nationality.
They are not mutually exclusive in Kazakhstan.
The main objectives of the APK include the preservation of inter-ethnic harmony
and political stability, developing new mechanisms for fostering healthy relations
between various ethnicities and nationalities within the state; to promote spiritual and
cultural enrichment; development and equality. Despite its ambiguity, and its close ties to
the executive branch, considering it was the APK, which proposed extending
Nazarbayev’s term, the APK enjoys a level of autonomy and influence on legislative
matters, but a new decree centralizing the aim of the APK around Kazakhstani identity
might raise some eyebrows (Jones 2010). The APK’s overarching goal is to essentially
supervise ethnic groups and their leaders so as to make sure inter-ethnic harmony
preserves Kazakhstan’s stability. The APK has been generally used to portray
Kazakhstan’s image as an inter-ethnic paradise.
The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan has generated many benefits for both
Kazakh society as well as its political infrastructure. Since its creation over two decades
ago, The APK has enabled minority ethnic groups the ability for representation,
protection and preservation, a guarantee that does not exists not only in developing states,
but in even some of the most developed states in the world experiencing minority and
ethnic tensions today.
While many have criticized and simplified the APK has an extension of President
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Nazarbayev’s arm into political affairs, seeing as he is the official Chairman of the
institution, these criticisms are premature and lack a clear objective understanding of the
regional landscape and history. This isn’t to suggest that Kazakhstan is a democratic
paradise, on the contrary. Kazakhstan exhibits significant shortcomings in press freedom,
political opposition, and economic competition. Furthermore, its tremendous oil wealth,
dubbed the resource curse, has often paralyzed the process of modernization. Still, the
extent of ethnic inclusion, representation and national unity are unprecedentedly higher in
Kazakhstan than any other Central Asian state (Oka 2009). As demonstrated in the
research, ethnic conflict was rampant in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A lack of
representation and guaranteed protection for minorities, as well as a robust mechanism
for preserving ethnic traditions, was accompanied by violent episodes between ethnic
groups. In Azerbaijan, ethnic minorities are suppressed and institutions like the APK in
Kazakhstan are absent. There are no constitutional provisions that protect minorities like
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Ukrainians, Russians, Germans, Kurds, Armenians, etc.
The mere fact that the APK has legislative authority, representation and leverage
as well as the presence of explicit constitutional provisions that protect ethnic minorities
both underscore the distinct degree of internal political development in Kazakhstan
(Jones 2010) This cannot be easily dismissed as a product of its resource abundance
relative to its neighbors, considering, even other post-Soviet states endowed with oil, like
Azerbaijan, are substantially more discriminatory towards ethnic minorities. Oil itself has
neither stifled nor promoted political development to coincide with economic
development. Rather, it has existed as a mere backdrop feature, while ethnic minorities’
fates remain largely in the political landscape and culture of the host nation. That is why
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in Kazakhstan, cultural and religious tolerance together have resulted in a less
contentious atmosphere, the necessary precondition for ethnic inclusion and institutional
development in that regard.
The most important element of this research is the consideration of the regional
implications as well as the theoretical implications. This research does not suggest that
Kazakhstan is in any way an advanced democratic state, but rather, that it has made
significant and commendable strides to protect its ethnic minorities which have in most
other cases suffered tremendous discrimination, violence and destitution. Ethnic
minorities in Kazakhstan contrarily, have access to social, political and economic capital
to advance their ethnic groups in society, protecting their heritage’s past and future (Oka
2004).
Furthermore other research on the region vindicates these assertions as
Kazakhstan has exhibited political stability and interethnic harmony since the dissolution
of the USSR in 1991. This has not been the case for other Central Asian & Post-Soviet
States, where ethnic conflict and exclusion are simultaneously prevalent. Even where
there is abundant oil, or the lack there of - when there are ongoing wars, or the lack
thereof - ethnic conflict exists wherever there is an absence of political institutions
designed to accommodate and advance their needs.
Even in the US and in most European countries like Germany, Northern Ireland
and Denmark, there are various institutions and accommodations designed to integrate
minorities into society and politics. The EPR data indicates that in situations where such
accommodations are made, ethnic conflict is less likely to occur. Contrarily, the absence
of institutional provisions meant to protect and integrate ethnic minorities beyond mere
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cultural tolerance will result in conflict.
Equally said is the need for more improvement for political development and
minority protection in Kazakhstan, given that most provisions are often nominal, at the
discretion of the Chairman and President, Nazarbayev. Furthermore, the low level of
democracy in Kazakhstan renders even the most genuine of efforts to accommodate
minority groups as politicized interests. The APK itself is limited in that it can likely be
abolished or ignored at the discretion of Nazarbayev given the two branches clash
(Tussupova 2010). As with most cases in Kazakhstan, the executive branch tends to
overpower the others. Kazakhstan boasts of a many ethnic minorities, but it appears that
granting the APK only 9 seats in parliament or the Majlis, is disproportionate to their
population. Such improvements could further legitimize the APK as an institution of
minority protection and ethnic harmony. Furthermore, Kazakhstan must work to integrate
ethnic minorities into all facets of Kazakh society, include the economy. Limits on free
press and political opposition also stifle the representative potential of the APK (Jones
2010).
Still it is worth noting that its mere existence is a stride towards democracy. As
demonstrated, in places around the world where ethnic groups are excluded and
underrepresented, there is higher chance that conflict might spur (Jones 2010).
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AZERBAIJAN
Political Structure
Azerbaijan’s constitution nominally ensures human rights and freedoms and
denotes its democratic institutions. This facade reveals the government’s terrible
performance in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and its incompetence. Its democratic
process came to an abrupt halt in June 1993, when a coup d’état brought former Politburo
member and KGB general Heydar Aliyev to power (Heinrich 2010).
In 1995, a new constitution was drafted. This solidified a strong executive branch,
with wide-ranging powers. The constitutional amendments of 2002 entitled Aliyev’s son
as the heir, and when Heydar Aliyev died in 2003 his son Ilham immediately replaced
him. More constitutional amendments in 2009 further strengthened the president’s grip
on power by abolishing executive term limits (Heinrich 2010). This has essentially
transpired into a form of monarchy or what has been referred to as neo-Sultanism (Clifton
et 2005).
The 1995 constitution guarantees an independent legislative branch. The
parliament or Majlis consisted of 125 members elected through a mixed majority
proportional electoral system in 1995. Parliamentary elections occurred every five years,
but the constitutional amendments of 2002 ended proportional representation. This
threatened minority rights. Ilham Aliyev’s ruling faction is New Azerbaijan Party (NAP).
According to the OSCE and international election observers, neither election has been
free nor fair (38).
Unlike Kazakhstan, the ruling regime in Azerbaijan is rooted in a national
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movement of independence. Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991 under the rule of
the former Soviet leadership, which was weakened by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
resulting in the opposition’s victory in 1992 (Kendall-Taylor 2012). The chairman of the
People’s Front, Abulfaz Elchibei, was elected new President of the Republic in 1992. But
the Karabakh conflict and worsening economic conditions, internal party
competitiveness, and interethnic tensions across the country between Azerbaijanis and
Armenians, Lezgins & Talysh, resulted in a military coup d’état and Elchibei resigned.
Even though a former opposition member led Azerbaijan, unlike Kazakhstan, he
had no realistic chance to fully implement the democratization of Azerbaijan it had
commenced. The coup introduced the former head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan,
Heydar Aliyev to power in 1993. He established a hardline, dynastic authoritarian
system, based on regional groups of elites. Similarly to Kazakhstan, this is a continuation
of the clan-based legacy of pre-Soviet times. It had been established initially by Aliyev
during his rule during the Soviet era and was reestablished in independent Azerbaijan.
As in Kazakhstan, there is no sustainable democratic alternative to the ruling elites in
Azerbaijan. Weak civil society is also observed in Kazakhstan.
Quantitative analysis demonstrates that oil-rich leaders can manipulate preelectoral fiscal policies to win over the electorate and weaken political rivals, but that this
isn’t as significant as the government’s tendency towards ethnic exclusivism. This
finding has important policy implications, which suggests that not only efforts to
strengthen a country’s electoral institutions may be a fruitful path for promoting
democracy in many petroleum-rich countries, but also the establishment of ethnically
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inclusive legislative apparatuses meant to proportionately represent and protect
minorities, especially those at risk.
A coup in Azerbaijan and the presence of active terrorist groups & national
liberation movements amidst pogroms and war against Armenians is hardly an indication
of the service oil abundance has done to manipulate elections & render regimes more
durable.
Azerbaijan has a population of approximately 8 million people, 91% of which are
ethnic Azeris. The main ethnic minorities are Lezgins (178,000 or 2.2 %), Russians
(141,700 or 1.8%), Talysh (76,800 or 1%), Avars (50,900 or 0.6%), Turks-Meskhetians
(43,400 or 0.5%), Tatars (30 thousand or 0.4% ), Ukrainians (2900 or 0.4%), Georgians
(14,900 or 0.2%), Kurds (13,100 or 0.2%), Tats (10,900 or 0.1%), and Jews (8,900 or
0.1%, which are divided into European (Ashkenazi), Mountainous and Georgian Jews)
(Arslan et al).
Since the majority of Azerbaijan is 90% ethnically Azeri, the rather small
minority is that much more vulnerable to nationalism xenophobia and ethnocentrism,
prompting an urgent need for measures that translate into proportional political
representation, civic and linguistic rights all of which are absent from the constitution and
from the national parliament (48). The absence of which have produced negative results
for ethnic minorities. Kazakhstan is more diverse, but even Turkmenistan, which is oil
rich and homogenous, does not exhibit any distinct instability. Turkmenistan is a Central
Asian state also with a Soviet & Islamic history.
Early on in Azerbaijan’s independence, security threats largely determined its
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foreign policy trajectory, which has been shaped mainly around the priority of oil
revenue. The collapse of the USSR caused an economic crisis in Azerbaijan amidst a
vacuum of political power. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is also multi-vector, because it is
characterized by a diplomatic approach of appeasing its various neighbors such as Iran,
Turkey & Russia while balancing its own national interests, namely oil. The legal status
of the Caspian Sea as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh War together set the course of
Azerbaijani foreign policy since its independence.
Unlike Kazakhstan however Azerbaijan is more vulnerable to foreign pressure.
This is evidenced by the boldness of Kazakhstan’s leadership. By shifting the capital city
from Almaty to Astana, which is closer to Russia, Kazakhstan made it clear that
secession was not an option, thereby demonstrating a degree of national selfdetermination and autonomy. I argue this is in part due to the accountability Nazarbayev
enjoys at home, especially among minorities who could otherwise pose a problem.
Russia officially opposed any Armenian territorial claims to Artsakh (NagornoKarabakh) and considered them a threat to the already teetering Caucasus. In response to
a riot against Armenian demands, the USSR sent troops to Baku in1990. This fomented
pro-independence and anti-Russian sentiments among Azeris and largely impacted the
future direction of the foreign and domestic policies of Azerbaijan.
Ayaz Mutalibov became the first president of the independent Republic of
Azerbaijan when Azerbaijan declared its independence on October 18, 1991. His priority
was maintaining strategic cooperation with Iran and Russia but the military defeats in
Karabakh destabilized and delegitimized his regime. After the Khodjaly massacre in
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1992, a presidential election was held in June and the Azerbaijan Popular Front leader,
Abulfez Elchibey, won (Ipek 2009).
He followed an anti-Russian strategy due to their rigid demands and instead
adopted pan-Turkism as the ideology of his party platform. In response Russia began
siding with Armenia, resulting in Azeri setbacks. Elchibey had also set his country on a
pro-Western course in foreign policy. Elchibey’s prioritized negotiations with Western
oil companies and made it clear to all foreign investors that mutually beneficial deals
would be guaranteed. Russia was totally excluded from contracts that would be
established with the West. Meanwhile the Armenian community in the US lobbied for
American support. In April 1992, the US Congress passed the “Freedom Support Act”
which allocated assistance to former Soviet republics transitioning towards democracy
and market economy, but one clause in the Freedom Support Act restricted the US
government’s assistance to Azerbaijan. This posed an obstacle for Azerbaijan’s efforts to
earn American assistance in strengthening its economy and national security (50).
Simultaneously, the Talish minority in the southern town of Lenkoran started an
upheaval. The Lezgin minority, inhabiting the North, was also mobilizing. Azerbaijan
was in chaos and threatened to collapse into a various regional districts united against the
central authorities in Baku. The new president Aliyev, succeeded in squashing these
rebellions (50).
Beyond homogeneity and secession as alternative explanations for Azerbaijani
ethnocentrism, there lies the dilemma of foreign policy for Azerbaijan, which largely
influences, shapes and determines the trajectory of the state. Since the beginnings of
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Russian imperialism, through Soviet rule, Turkish and Iranian influence, Azerbaijan has
been at the whims of the foreign powers. Each of these powers harbors their own
interests, which often contrary to the interests of the region at large. While leaders like
Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan have managed this type of pressure by world powers through
a multi-vector policy approach that places Kazakhstan’s stability as its priority,
Azerbaijani leadership has reacted contrarily. President Ilham Aliyev, and his
predecessors have sought to reap the benefits of such pressures, instead of balancing them
with the grievances of Azerbaijanis, minorities included. This has resulted in tensions
between the state and its minorities, as well as more moderate Azerbaijanis. Furthermore,
it illuminates the vulnerability of Azerbaijan to foreign powers, and sheds further light on
the relationship between authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and imperialism.

Ethnic Exclusion & Conflict in Azerbaijan
In stark contrast, on the other side of the Caspian Sea, is the case of Azerbaijan.
There are four major cases of ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, including tensions with
Armenians, Kurds, Lezgins and Talysh. A 2009 census reveals ethnic minorities in
Azerbaijan, represent 8.9% of the population, including Lezgin (the largest minority
group, making up 2.0% of the population), Russian (1.3%) and others, such as the Talysh
making up 1.5%. The Armenian population of Azerbaijan in the 1900s was 12% it is now
1.5% (Kendall-Taylor 2012).
Azerbaijan’s political structure is mainly nominal and very centralized with little
to no press freedom. Private and public goods are managed and owned by a family run
state. This type of underdevelopment coincides with a nominal constitution and fake
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elections. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy against Armenia eventually resulted in a coup
d’état as a response to the war in Artsakh. Violent ethnic cleansing campaigns and
decapitation strikes against the Armenian minority would ensue. Currently there are no
provisions to protect and preserve the rights, representation, languages and identities of
the Lezgin, Talysh, Armenian, and Kurds (Kendall-Taylor 2012).
Azerbaijan’s transition, initially aimed at democracy building, was not completed
and has led to the installation and a formation of a new type of autocracy. The regime
type in Azerbaijan can be described as “sultanistic semi-authoritarianism” (Guliyev
2005). Interestingly, “sultanistic semi-authoritarianism” commenced in 1993 when
Heydar Aliyev buried the second democratic experiment in Azerbaijani history. There are
opposition parties, civil society organizations, and unfree press outlets in Azerbaijan,
which are allowed to function to the extent that they do not menace the regime’s
existence (Meissner 2011).
Surprisingly, some of the post-Soviet states have a stable and prevalent tendency
to become even more undemocratic (take, for instance, Uzbekistan or, even worse,
Turkmenistan). In these cases, non-democracy tends to become institutionalized,
undermining the very prospects of successful and complete transition and further
consolidation (Mateeva 1997). This is particularly true with the region that is often
geographically identified as Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, this is not a subregional peculiarity; all states of the post-Soviet world demonstrate a clear variance in
transition outcomes and all still have to do a lot to become democracies and not merely
façade democracies. Azerbaijan represents a perfect case of a political regime that has
fallen into the gray zone of political uncertainty and ambiguity.
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It is evident that institutionalized corruption and nepotism, which are peculiar
traits of a “sultanistic” type of political regime, are present in Azerbaijan. Family,
cronies, clans, and patronage are more influential social constructions than formal legal
institutions. The Academy of Public Administration under the president of the Azerbaijan
Republic in Baku, for instance, is not understood as a higher education institution that
operates under the institution of presidency. On the contrary, it is perceived by the
university administration and professorship as a service for training a younger generation
of “Aliyevphils” (Guliyev 2005).
Before Stalin, politics in the USSR encouraged cultural diversity and ethnic
identity. Minority ethnic groups enjoyed their own schools and published multiple
magazines and editorials. This was operated by the state. Ethnic inclusion went as far as
creating alphabets for ethnic groups without written languages. Everything changed when
Stalin came to power. Policy towards ethnic groups would be fundamentally transformed
forever (Gerber 2007). Ethnic grievances were repressed were impossible to address.
Autonomy was not a matter for debate or discussion.
Soviet population censuses intentionally minimized the demographics of minority
ethnic populations or, rather, they were grouped into larger ethnic communities. Some
vanished entirely from the Soviet ethnic map. Part of the USSR’s malicious ethnic
policies, was to aggregate Muslim ethnicities, such as the Kurds, Talysh, and Lezgins
into “Turks” as an assimilation tactic to encourage Azeri ethnic predominance.
Most of the Armenians, many Russians, Jew and Greeks have already left
Azerbaijan. According to a 1999 census, the Russian population in Azerbaijan fell to a
third of its 1979 level. The current estimates are even lower, at about 100,000 Russians
40

actually living in the country. This in the Soviet sense was a method of nation building
from central command (Gerber 2007). Moreover, minorities are seen as susceptible to
manipulation by outsiders, since many of them live in the border areas next to their kin
states.
Secessionist movements in the early 90s largely influenced the state’s approach
towards ethnic minorities. Aliyev’s approach to minority policy was a continuation of the
Soviet tradition of suppressing political demands for autonomy for ethnic groups.
The state practiced detention and prosecution for even alleged separatists, such as
Talysh and Lezgins, who were given arbitrary long jail sentences for their “terrorist
activities”. The president himself nominates local authorities.
According to the Azeri constitution, every person has the right to preserve its
national or ethnic identity, and while Azerbaijan became a Member of the Council of
Europe in 2001, signed and ratified the Framework Convention on National Minorities
Azerbaijan has still not set up a special legal framework addressing the rights of national
minorities. This pales in comparison to the APK in Kazakhstan, which does exactly that.
A new Law on the State Language was passed by the parliament in 2002,
demanding all procedures be in Azerbaijani. No provisions in the new law ensure the
right for national minorities to use their native languages in public life. Minorities are
even restricted in their right to use their language in the public. Moreover, Azerbaijan has
yet to ratify the European Language Charter. Legal guarantees for national minorities to
receive education have been reduced since 1992, with the passing of the Law on the State
Language which made it ambiguous the extent to which languages are persevered and
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allowed to be taught in schools. There is no state program for the integration of minorities
into the Azeri society, unlike Kazakhstan’s APK (Clifton et 2005).

Armenians
The situation with Armenia is likely the worst, and involves a ‘secessionist’
movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefor the NK conflict can be seen as a product of
three ambitions, ethnic power balance in Azerbaijani politics as well as selfdetermination & territorial secession. The history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can
be traced to the dissolution of the USSR. The decentralization of power, and the vacuum
of power left by the absence of an authoritarian central authority, led to the emergence of
nationalist movements. In many cases, arbitrary boundaries and geographic heritages
were even further confused. Following the establishment of post-soviet republics such as
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, conflict ensued between Azerbaijan and its Armenian
population. Nagorno-Karabakh is 80% Armenian in population, but remains within the
boundaries of Azerbaijan. Without independence and disconnection from its Armenian
homeland, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh to Armenians) has become another symbol of
Azerbaijan’s ethnic nationalism & aggression.
An utter suppression and discrimination of Armenian culture, language and
freedom is part of policy in Azerbaijan. While the conflict is arguably territorial, the
pogroms of Armenian-Azerbaijanis as well as other mentioned characteristics of the
Azeri state demonstrate that necessary national provisions such as ethnic minority
protections were not only unsecured, they were blatantly averted so as to strengthen the
ruling party’s grasp on power under the banner of Azerbaijani ethnic nationalism.
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Various pogroms and massacres of Armenians prompted a mass exodus to Armenia and
NK from the Azerbaijani mainland. This mass exodus numbers up to 350,000 Armenians
(Country Report 2015). Prior to the onset of the conflict, which began in the 80s, interethnic tensions were brewing. A series of pogroms, such as the Sumgait, Baku,
Kirovabad or Maraga targeted Armenian minorities in Azerbaijan. In essence,
“Armenophobia is institutionalized and engrained into Azerbaijani statehood & Karabakh
is at the center of this “policy”.
Some of the approximately 20,000 to 30,000 citizens of Armenian descent living
in the country reported discrimination in employment, housing, and the provision of
social services. Ethnic Armenians often concealed their ethnicity by legally changing the
ethnic designation in their passports. There were no reports of violence against
Armenians during the year. Some groups reported sporadic incidents of discrimination,
restrictions on their ability to teach in their native languages, and harassment by local
authorities. These groups included Talysh in the south, Lezgins in the north, and
Meskhetians and Kurds (Country Reports 2015).
Destruction of cemeteries so as to erase Armenian history and heritage, the
targeting of religious infrastructure, denying entry, and linguistic suppression are all
policy practices of the Azerbaijani state, which explicitly target and discriminate against
Armenians. Such harassment of Armenians by the Azeri state persists today.
The Lezgins exhibit a different condition. They are now considered the most
vocal minority claiming discrimination in Azerbaijan (Fayos 2014). They make up the
second-largest group in Azerbaijan. Lezgins often disguise themselves as Azeris to avoid
losing job opportunities or discrimination in education. As a result, current official
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statistics in Azerbaijan have arbitrarily reduced the population.
In 1989, another ethnic minority, the Talysh (on which I elaborate further along)
gained the right to register as a distinct ethnic group. The accurate number of Talysh in
Azerbaijan may be much higher than census results, which is due to the suppression of
their identity, language and culture, “leading to internalized self-repression”. Azerbaijan
lacks any robust, comprehensive legislation regarding ethnic minorities. The presidential
decree of 1992 is insufficient in this sense. It lacks a “national framework for minority
rights protection” and limits the focus to arts and crafts. Azerbaijan also lacks legislation
to tackle anti-discriminations issues (Fayos 2014).
There is no political institution or constitutional provision that addresses needs of
the minority, unlike the APK in Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan does have the “Office of the
Ombudsman”, which aims to compensate for this void however the priority of the state is
less on minority inclusion and more on preventing secessionist movements. Such is
symbolic of the paranoia, which dictates the Azerbaijani regime, compared to
Kazakhstan’s harmonious and unifying approach. Any legal frameworks proclaimed by
the Azerbaijani state to protect minorities is exaggerated, and often only nominal.
There are few institutions as mentioned before which aim to support ethnic
minorities in Azerbaijan, but none of them, neither the Forum of Religious Communities
of Azerbaijan nor the Coordination Council of the Cultural Centers of National
Minorities are involved in policy-making. They serve merely as consultative bodies and
nominal entities. This is in sharp contrast to the APK in Kazakhstan, which not only
protects and preserves ethnic minority culture – it grants them representation in the
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national legislature and the ability to propose laws.
Furthermore indicative of Azerbaijan’s ethnic exclusion is the fact that it has still
not ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. The fact that
Azerbaijan actively promotes the usage of the Azeri language underscores the need for
some type of institutional protection for ethnic minority groups. Unlike Kazakhstan
where the populace relatively respects laws and institutions, the “Law on State
Language” in Azerbaijan, undermines any of the constitutional provisions, which
guarantee minority ethnic groups linguistic rights. There is, however, a lack of national
legislation for preserving and promoting the use of minority languages (Fayos 2014).
The downside of being accepted into greater Azerbaijani society is that minorities
risk losing their languages. Indeed, while some minorities appear able to preserve their
linguistic other ethnic groups appear to be losing ground to linguistic assimilation; many
members of the largest groups (e.g. the Talysh and the Lezgins) have expressed
displeasure at this outcome, requesting greater government attention (Marquardt 2011).
Azerbaijani multiculturalist policy of appeasing minorities without giving them
real rights pales in comparison to Kazakhstan’s APK. In Kazakhstan ethnic minorities
have legislative representatives that can actually vote on national policy. Minorities are
free to preserve and educate in their indigenous languages( and broadcast media in their
respective languages – all of which is explicitly prohibited in Azerbaijan (Marquardt
2011).
I argue that the ethnocentric dimension of the Azeri state is influenced mainly by
Turkey’s sensitivity to the “Armenian question”; while the authoritarian character is a
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legacy of continued Russian influence. If the political culture resembled Kazakhstan
more closely, perhaps cognitive decisions to protect minorities by the state would be
taken into account because they would provide for more accountability at home, and thus
less dependence on the appeasement of powerful neighbors.
To the Azerbaijani state, ethnic identity is associated with the events in NagornoKarabakh; the Talysh state which was briefly declared in 1993 and the Lezgins
independence movement, which began in the early 1990s. Likewise, these groups are
seen as easily manipulated by outside forces that wish to harm Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. The Azeri government sees all ethnic identity movements as imperial schemes
by Russia to instigate separatism, whether it is among the Lezgins or the Armenians
(Marquardt 2011).
Kazakhstan is more politically developed as a result mainly of its political culture
and history as a diverse state.
The comparison of these two post-Soviet states is to demonstrate that the imperial
soviet legacies were not as significant as expected in determining future stability. In
Kazakhstan, the establishment of an institution that promotes ethnic diversity and
tolerance, the APK reflects the pluralistic ideology of Kazakhstan, contrary to what has
become the ethno-nationalistic character of the Azerbaijani state.
Unlike Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has a cognitive national preference & political
culture inclined towards ethno-nationalism/centrism. This ideology is wrapped around
Aliyev's cult of personality, and therein shields the authoritarian structure of Azerbaijan's
state. The system is designed to suppress any attempt at decentralizing power for the sake
of minority representation and indigenous ethnic rights such as linguistic education for
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Talysh & Lezgin minorities.
The dispute between Azerbaijan & Armenia is not territorial. With a 98%
Armenian population it is pretty evident that Artsakh belongs to independence and
Armenia, as per its own people's self determination, but certainly not to Stalin's
manufactured modern Azerbaijani territory. The problem, as with most regions rife with
ethnic disputes and conflict, is the authoritarian and exclusivist nature of the government.
Ethnic minorities are not protected; and thus violence ensues. The territorial dispute is a
result of the legacy of Stalinism, and in fact is more a reflection of the state of
Azerbaijan’s authoritarian, ethnocentric & exclusivist character. The data demonstrates
this by controlling not only for oil and “imperial past” which is also relevant, but also
through the variable of “ongoing war”. The findings support the argument that neither
ongoing wars, imperial pasts, resource curses nor secessionist movements have caused
the ethnic violence in Azerbaijan, but rather its political structure (Wimmer et al 2009).
Talysh
The Talysh peoples are an ethnic group with a distinct language and culture
seeking greater autonomy within Azerbaijan. They have their own language, Talyshi,
which is suppressed by law enforcement. The largest concentration of Talysh people is in
southern Azerbaijan and northwestern Iran with major population center in the city of
Lenkoran. Azerbaijan’s Turkic linguistic nationalist policy discourages the Talysh
minority from practicing and preserving its own language.
Talysh press & literature enjoyed free distribution until Stalin came to power.
This era saw Talysh being sent to gulags & closures of local media. Talysh were
encouraged to assimilate into Azerbaijani SSR culture. Ironically, being part of the USSR
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also prevented them from being entirely vulnerable to Azerbaijani nationalism, and thus
enabled the Talysh heritage to carry on until today. While the Talysh were never fully
realized by any of their more powerful neighbors like Russia or Iran, it wasn’t until the
birth of the Azeri state that ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism became a major threat
to their persistence and survival.
There is no formal education in the Talysh language and Talysh people are
encouraged to speak in Azeri or Persian. According to UNESCO, the number of young
people being educated in Talysh is dropping significantly. One of the key aims of the
Nationalist Talysh Movement (NTM) is greater linguistic freedom. In 1993, violence
overtook the Caucasus. The Talysh seized this opportunity and established Talyshstan, an
autonomous republic within Azerbaijan. The Azeri coup, which ushered in the Aliyev
family rule, ended this brief autonomy abruptly. This might underscore the association
between the significance of Aliyev’s distinct authoritarian and nationalist policy agenda
versus his predecessors as the primary cause of minority suppression and ethnic conflict
with Armenians. Official census figures place Talysh population at 500,000 but they
claim the number is much higher, closer to one million, another tactic perhaps to suppress
minority rights movements. It is important to note there are 43 known unrepresented
indigenous peoples across the globe (Busdachin 2015). Of them, two are in Azerbaijan.
That is telling.
In June 1993, during heightened military tensions Azerbaijan, a small military
unit leader in southern Azerbaijan proclaimed himself leader of a so-called ”TalyshMugan Republic” and immediately ordered to break-away and establish a distinct
republic of seven districts in south-east Azerbaijan, which is also known as Talyshstan
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(Gerber 2007). The local population, however, did not support him. His plan to take
advantage of the general political turmoil was miscalculated, and his upraise was easily
crushed by the regime of Heidar Aliev. Most Azeris agreed this ‘coup’ was orchestrated
by the Russian KGB, to keep the Caucasus under its control.”
Still today the dilemma of an accurate census of the Talysh community is yet to
be resolved. “The suppression of Talysh identity and their inability to disseminate their
culture and language during the Soviet period has left its traces.” There is a constant
paranoia of being accused of colluding with Armenia or Russia. This causes a fear of
expressing any kind of national expressions. Official statistics indicate the population at
76,800 people. In sharp contrast, Talysh activists claim a figure upwards of a million
Talysh living in Azerbaijan. Some Talysh wish for integration, others demand rights, and
another group wants secession (Gerber 2007). Talysh identity is tenuous. It is practically
impossible to gauge support for Talysh grievances. This is likely due to Azerbaijan’s
descent into a police state. Talysh activists are worried about the fate of the Talysh
culture, history and language. The primary claims of the Talysh people are to establish a
faculty for the Talysh language in the Lenkeran State University; to broadcast Talyshlanguage television programs on state TV for numerous hours a week, and to get receive
state funds for the establishment and upkeep of important Talysh cultural activities and
traditions, like for example folkloric dance. Talysh activists went further to state they
would like for Talysh to be an officially recognized state language, among others. Some
of the Talysh activists we met went as far as saying that Azerbaijani language developed
out of the Talysh language. In February 2007, Novruzali Mammadov, head of the Talysh
Cultural Center was arrested in Baku and indicted on charged of “high treason” (Gerber
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2007).

Lezgins
The Lezgin are the second minority group in Azerbaijan and may perhaps pose
the greatest dilemma for future Azerbaijani minority policy. The Lezgins are descendants
of the Caucasian people who inhabited Southern Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan. The
Lezgins were subsequently divided in 1860 when Tsarist Russia split their community
between the Russian Federation in Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The first wave of protest
took place on 5 December 1921 to accelerate the settlement of the problem on the borders
with Azerbaijan, and including in Dagestan the disputed Azerbaijani areas, which were
part of Azerbaijan (Mateeva 1997).
As reported in the 1989 Soviet census, 466,833 Lezgins were registered in the
Soviet Union. The numbers of Lezgins presently living in Dagestan and Azerbaijan are
subject to dispute, and estimates are often used in political debates. According to official
Soviet census figures (1989), there were 171,395 in Azerbaijan (about 3% of the
population) and 204,370 in Dagestan (about 12% of the republic’s population). Lezgins
generally dispute the official 1989 population figures for Azerbaijani Lezgins across the
political spectrum. Their estimates vary from twice the official figure to 1 million. A
Lezgin diaspora also currently exists in Turkey (Mateeva 1997).
It is argued that the Lezgin population in Azerbaijan has not risen over the last
half-century at the expected rate. Thus it is believed that a significant proportion of the
Lezgin population has been registered as another ethnic group. One possible explanation
50

for this phenomenon is that Azerbaijani policy in the 1950s only granted free education to
children registered as Azeri, and there was a strong incentive to claim Azeri ethnicity in
official records. The low number of Lezgin registrants might also be an indication of the
impression that Lezgins are considered to be second-class citizens. In addition to
mountainous regions, the areas inhabited by Lezgins are comprised of productive
agricultural lands. The main sources of employment in the Lezgin areas are agriculture. A
number of agricultural produce factories are also located in these areas.
The main language of instruction in schools in Azerbaijan is either Azerbaijani or
Russian. There is a high degree of inter-marriage between Lezgins and Azeris, and
relations between the two groups in general remain stable. Moreover, most Lezgins in
Azerbaijan have a good command over the Azeri language. Yet with the rise of ethnic
nationalism under President Elchibei, the Lezgins, as well as other minorities, felt as if
they were being treated as second-class citizens. The attempt to draft 1,500 Lezgins into
the Azerbaijani army in March 1993 led to violent clashes between Azeri police and
70,000 Lezgin protesters. (Mateeva 1997). Episodes of interethnic tensions first appeared
in 1992, and the Popular Front government began to make arrests at the end of that year.
After Pan-Turkism became a dominant ideology in Azerbaijan, Lezgin separatism was
more active, aggravated by a number of aspects of the transition from the Soviet system,
including the border closure. Usually the Lezgin protest rallies would begin in Azerbaijan
and be replicated in Dagestan. In March 1993, twelve Lezgins trafficking in illegal arms
were arrested and later released. In 1994 a prominent Lezgin activist was arrested and
convicted to four years imprisonment with no right of appeal. Two SADVAL protest
incidents & mass riots ensued.
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Grievances from the Lezgin emanate from their linguistic, representative but also
their military rights. Essentially the border between Azerbaijan & Russia acts as a buffer
zone where Lezgins are often subject to armed attacks and preventative measures against
unification and national liberation.
In addition to claiming that Lezgins have a full and equal place in Azerbaijani
society, alleged indicators of Lezgin dissatisfaction are discounted or explained away by
the authorities. In some cases, they are refuted despite the fact that some incidents had
been widely reported. It is explained that in the first years of the new state, there were
many things about which the population as a whole was unhappy; thus any opposition by
the Lezgins had to be put into that context. For example, since the reported refusal of
Lezgins to serve in the army between 1993-1994 was a common occurrence among the
population in general, it did not reflect a lack of identification with the new state by
Lezgins. It was acknowledged that the process of transition was a difficult period for all
citizens due to the lack of resources and the breakdown of services.
The Lezgin National Movement, otherwise known as SADVAL, which was
founded in June 1990 is the main political representative of the Lezgin people. Its
primary political objective was to unite all Lezgins in a sovereign state of Lezgins, or as
an entity within the Russian Federation or Azerbaijan. An official declaration on
statehood and a resolution on changes in the border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan
were issued at the second SADVAL Congress in September 1991. The organization also
demanded proportionate representation of Lezgins in the parliaments of the Russian
Federation and Azerbaijan.
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It is doubtful whether SADVAL has a mass appeal in the Lezgin areas, or any
meaningful grass-roots support. The majority of ordinary Lezgins do not share the radical
demands of the activists, but fear of assimilation of their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan by what
is regarded as Turkish nationalistic policies (Mateeva 1997).
Although SADVAL is not a strong or popular movement, it comprises a number
of extremely vocal individuals whose behavior and statements are held suspect by
authorities in Azerbaijan (Mateeva 1997). The Azerbaijani government seems to be
worried over the possibility that the demands of minorities could be given credibility or
their organizations legitimacy locally and internationally.
As previously mentioned, a clause was included in the law on political parties
forbidding parties that represent specific ethnic groups to be established. Thus the
proposed Lezgin Democratic Party was not allowed to register or enroll its leader in the
1995 Parliamentary elections as an independent candidate.
The situation of the Lezgin people is of great concern to the government since
they might become subject to outside manipulation and could therefore be used to create
difficulties. The general view of the central government is that any attempt to express
minority grievances or to raise the question of autonomy is a threat to the security of the
state. Still, the Azerbaijani government does not envisage a popular base for massive
unrest by the Lezgin community and seeks to avoid any impression that there are
problems associated with the Lezgin community. A member of the opposition stated that
they agree with the government’s claim that there is no specific discrimination against
Lezgins. Where the opposition differed from the government was in their concern over
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abuses of human rights in the country, which affected Lezgins as well as all other
citizens, regardless of ethnicity. The opposition wanted these abuses ended for both the
Lezgin and Azerbaijani community in general (Mateeva 1997).
Azerbaijani policy makes it difficult to put any specific minority issues, such as
cultural recognition or community division, on the governmental agenda. This, to an
extent, resembles the pattern of the Soviet nationalities’ policy, which officially did not
recognize ethnicity as a significant affiliation that affected social opportunities, but in
reality supported cultural identities and also used ethnicity for political purposes. As
noted earlier, the opposition shares a generally modernist stance, which supports an
approach based on universal human rights and the equality of all individuals. Yet the
opposition does not support the more suppressive features of the state’s position, which
indicate ethnocentric and authoritarian tendencies (Mateeva 1997).
There are other current developments, which have a differential effect on ethnic
communities, the border being an important example. There is no suggestion that the
central government is satisfied with the present arrangements or that policy is motivated
by ethnic considerations. Nonetheless, the current situation does affect Lezgins more than
any other group. Therefore the central government is vulnerable to charges made by
separatist forces that their management of problems is negligent, and that the government
would have adopted a different attitude if Azeris were affected. Such an argument might
not be accurate, but it could touch a sensitive chord in the Lezgin community if the level
of harm was sufficiently high.
Azerbaijan has a system, which is based on the individual without reference to
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ethnic identity. It is therefore likely that Lezgins will make a comparison between the
effects of these different policy stances on their welfare. For example, each of these
entities have taken different approaches to the language question in schools. Lezgin was
the language of instruction in national schools until 1972, and there could be resentment
over the choice not to use Lezgin as the language of instruction for Lezgin children in
Azerbaijan (Mateeva 1997).
The population of Lezgins in Azerbaijan is between 650,000-800,000. They have
their own language. They are predominantly Sunni Muslims, unlike their Talysh Shia
counterparts. Since both groups are discriminated against regardless of their sect, this
suggests religion plays little role in determining ethnic policies of the state.
In Azerbaijan, a stubborn centralized ethnonationalist government that is
authoritarian towards its subjects and dictatorial towards minorities shapes the political
culture. This is a cognitive, conscious choice; a reflection of political culture in
Azerbaijan, whereas in Kazakhstan, the culture is more bent towards tolerance and
harmony and thus sees a less authoritarian involvement in the suppression of minority
languages and politics.
The Lezgins were upset over underrepresentation in the Azerbaijani Majlis
(parliament) after a change in political structure, a shift away from proportional
representation in the parliamentary elections of November 2005. The Lezgins previously
had two representatives in parliament but now numbers only one.
It is important to note that, much like many ethnic dilemmas, particularly in the
post-Soviet regions, irredentism is a common case, with ethnic groups divided along
“artificial” national borders. For example, the state border between the Russian
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Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan divides a single, compact area of settlement of
the Lezgins. This is comparable to the Kurdish problem in the Middle East. Lezgistan is
essentially Russian Dagestan & Northern Azerbaijan. Before the Russian Revolution,
"Lezgin" was a term used to describe all ethnic groups living in present-day Russian
Republic of Dagestan.
SADVAL was created to unite Dagestan & Azerbaijani’s Lezgin nations,
considered a terrorist organization by Azerbaijan, it has the main aims of advancing the
status of Lezgins in the region. In 1994, a terrorist attack in Baku was attributed to
SADVAL & the Lezgin movement. This might be in response to suppression of linguistic
disbursement and absence of legislative representation.
Lezgins mainly express concern over underrepresentation in the Azerbaijani
Parliament (Majlis) after a shift away from proportional representation in the
parliamentary elections of November 2005. Lezgins had been represented by two
members of parliament in the previous parliament, but are now represented by only one.
A research experiment on minorities in the Caucasus analyzes 43 news articles
and opinion columns. Opinion columns appear less frequent than news articles.
Furthermore, some of the analyzed media items placed in the opinion columns of the
media outlets do not strictly fall into the category “opinion”, as in several cases, they
represent a reportage or simple coverage rather than analysis. Tackling the issue of these
groups analytically or through individual opinion columns is uncommon. The media
coverage is generally very low for all groups. Yet, the media coverage of the displaced
persons is twice more than that of Lezgins.
Other common topics were related to the past and potential conflicts. The 1918
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massacre in Guba, the attacks perpetrated by the SADVAL movement in 1994, the
looming Islamist threats and increasing recruitment to ISIS in the neighboring Dagestan
was mentioned often in relation with Lezgins. The media items quoted the President and
Azerbaijani officials more often than Lezgins in the articles related to them
Generally, the media represents Lezgins and other minority groups positively as
people loving their traditions and living in peace and harmony with the majority. In some
instances, one could critically view the denotations of minorities as “numerically small
people”, “national minorities living in our country”, or the interchangeable use of “ethnic
group” and “nationality” to imply ethnicity, more characteristic of the Soviet
“nationalities policy”.
It Has Been 22 Years Since the Baku Metro Bombings 2016. Few media items
reflected the opinions and attitudes expressed by the minorities. The media items
analyzed preferred to showcase opinions and views expressed by Azerbaijani officials
and the President. One research study compared media coverage of the Lezgin minority
compared to displaced persons and found that displaced persons were more likely to get
coverage. This suggests that the media promotes the state’s agenda of avoiding
acknowledgement of ethnic minorities. (Arslan et al).
The state’s view is that the Lezgin people do not exist in any form and denies
constructive examination of the situation, “including dual citizenship, the establishment
of a free economic zone or cultural autonomy”. It is as if the fulfillment of Lezgin rights
present threats to Azerbaijani power — or rather the platform of the incumbent regime.
Dual citizenship for Lezgins is a contentious issue for Azerbaijan because ethnic
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Russians in Azerbaijan could be encouraged to demand that same right. Avars,
Tskhakurs, Kumyks, and Tatars (smaller minorities in Azerbaijan) might obtain the
citizenship in Russia, which might dampen the loyalty of minorities in Azerbaijan.
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani regime is paranoid about creating a “free economic
zone” for Lezgins because it could encourage better ties between the Lezgins in
Azerbaijan and across the border in Dagestan, Russia. The elite in Azerbaijan are
optimistic about the country’s future including that of its minorities such as the Lezgins.
But the state depends on its oil industry for such appeasement.
These realities present numerous prospective dilemmas. The current minority
rights conditions in Azerbaijan does affect Lezgins more than any other group. Lezgins
see a distinction between different policy stances on their general welfare. In Dagestan,
Lezgin was the language of instruction in national schools until 1972. Surely resentment
has been built up over the years over the decision not to prohibit the use of Lezgin
language of instruction for Lezgin children in Azerbaijan (Mateeva 1997).
A state in the situation of Azerbaijan has three options. It can treat ethnic diversity
as a historical nuisance, which should not have any place in a modern state; decisions
should be made on the basis of equity and fairness across the whole community, and the
state should protect equality of all citizens. Mobilization in society should be based on
merit. From this view, “ethnic identity should not be the basis for either decision making
or the allocation of rights and privileges.” Recognizing ethnic differences might be
harmful since they would encourage differences between members of society and cause
divisive tensions. This would be troublesome, during this stage of development in
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Azerbaijan, especially when efforts are focused on developing a homogenous identity
loyal to the new state.
Adherents of the pluralism encourage the recognition of ethnic distinctions that
might help reduce inequality. Centralists argue that the state should operate society and
determine loyalty and identity, which tends towards authoritarianism and the end of
opposition. It also encourages violence and dissent. The desire to preserve the unitary
state raised suspicion of minorities (Mateeva 1997).
The Azerbaijani government is concerned over demands of minorities that could
receive international credibility. Azerbaijan law forbids parties that represent and operate
along ethnic lines. The Lezgin Democratic Party was not prohibited to compete in the
1995 Parliamentary elections. Azerbaijan insists that despite this reality, it promotes
minority rights. It also claims the Lezgin community does pose any threat to society.
Even though Lezgins in Azerbaijan may be loyal to the state, their disenfranchisement as
true citizens with benefits therein could increase tensions and result in violence. It can be
suggested that perceived Lezgin problems are more related to the overall issues of
governance in Azerbaijan than to particular ethnic grievances.
On 12 September 1992, the government “Decree on National Minorities and
Ethnic Groups” sought to distribute state assistance and to secure the right of cultural
autonomy of minority/ethnic groups. In any event, the Popular Front party did not have
the chance to implement this decree, as it lost power in mid-1993. Azerbaijan is a unitary
state, which strongly rejects the autonomy arrangements for its indigenous minorities,
particularly the Talysh and Lezgins. Power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of
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the central government. The Lezgins constitute a greater proportion of the population in
Azerbaijan than they do in the Russian Federation, the problems and concerns of the
Lezgin people have a greater significance to the former.
Lezgin grievances are of great concern as they are vulnerable to outside
manipulation and could therefore be used to create difficulties. The official position of
the state is against the expression of minority grievances like autonomy because it is a
“threat to national security”. The government does not approve of their grievances to
avoid the impression that there are problems in Azerbaijan associated with the Lezgin
community or any minority for that matter.
The Lezgin National Centre is a cultural center that was registered in Azerbaijan
in January 1992, which then was transformed into a social and political organization. It is
focuses on language and the cultural rights of Lezgins and is affiliated with the
Azerbaijani government.
The inability of SADVAL to get attention in Azerbaijan, has given them a bad
reputation among the general public. Still many empathize and do not consider Lezgins
as political prisoners. SADVAL appears more willing than ever to adopt a radical, violent
approach.
The Lezgin Democratic Party was founded and registered in 1992, although its
registration was withdrawn in 1995 on the grounds that ethnically based parties were
prohibited by law in Azerbaijan, it was eventually allowed under President Aliyev, but
are viewed with suspicion. Officials suspect activists of using the Lezgin issue to build a
political platform for their personal gain.
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Lezgins comprise the second largest group after the ethnic Azeris. They live in the
northern part of the state along the border with Russia. According to the 1999 census, the
Lezgin population is 178,000 and accounts for 2.2% of Azerbaijan’s population.
Azerbaijan’s figures are often distorted for political purposes, and the figures are likely
closer to 260,000. The Lezgis from Azerbaijan have close relations to Dagestan.
Dagestan is part of the Russian Federation and is home to 260,000 Lezgins. Their
connection influences their relation to their official nation-state Azerbaijan.
In the early 90s ethnic minorities like the Lezgins and Talysh considered
themselves Azeri. Tensions between Lezgins and Azeris began in 1992, but reached a
peak in mid-1994. The state policy of forcibly drafting Lezgins men into the army for
deployment in the war in Karabakh resulted in a high backlash and mobilization of the
Lezgins. During this time a strong sense of collective identity was forged. Mass
demonstrations against the draft occurred, many of which turned violent.
“SADVAL” or Unity was founded in 1991. In 1994, the Azeri authorities banned
SADVAL after accusing group members of carrying out bomb attack on the Baku metro.
The largest grievance of the Lezgins people is the arbitrary carving up of their lands that
occurred during soviet disintegration.
The growing strength of Azeri nationalism has disempowered secessionist or
nationalist movements. Currently, Lezgins prioritize cultural protections rather than
political autonomy, which might support the idea of the establishment of a legislative
body for minority ethnic representation. This could reduce incentive of SADVAL. But it
appears Aliyev’s government prefers the benefits of exploiting ethnocentric policy.
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In November 2005 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, the Lezgin language
was reportedly the main electoral issue for candidates from Lezgin populated
areas. The most frequent complaints by Azerbaijan’s Lezgins include the
negligence of Lezgin language education and Lezgin media (Clifton et 2005).
Government authorities often exploit fear tactics by associating any legitimate
grievance of the Lezgin community with Armenian, Russian or even Islamist collusion.

Kurds

The Kurdish community in Azerbaijan was nearly gone by 1920. Many moved to
Armenia to establish villages. Kurds in Azerbaijan had their own region called Red
Kurdistan in the Lachin region. In 1930 Red Kurdistan was abolished and Kurds were
officially re-categorized as Azerbaijani. This would lead to the Soviet authorities
deporting most of the Kurdish population of Azerbaijan and Armenia to Kazakhstan.
That Kurds found refuge in Kazakhstan but not in Azerbaijan is of note (20).

The Kurdish history in Azerbaijan has been erased. In a 1979 census no Kurds
were recorded. Turkey and Azerbaijan coordinated a policy against the Kurds, like
"forced assimilation, manipulation of population figures, settlement of non-Kurds in
areas predominantly Kurdish, and the suppression of publications and abolition of
Kurdish as a medium of instruction in schools". Kurdish historical figures were required
to be described as Azeris. Kurds who retained 'Kurdish' as their nationality on their
passports as opposed to 'Azeri' were unable to find employment (Orson et al 1994).

In the 1990s, Kurdish organizations have repeatedly demanded the restoration of
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‘Red Kurdistan’, and (in 1992) proclaimed a ‘Kurdish Republic’. ‘Red Kurdistan’ is
currently occupied by Armenian troops. Whatever grievances the Kurds have against
Baku, and they are surely many, including decades of forced assimilation. The Kurds of
Azerbaijan were largely assimilated into Azerbaijani society, partly through the use of
brutal means of repression. Eventually Azerbaijan would deport all of its Kurdish
population to the chagrin of the USSR & Turkey all the way to Kazakhstan. But why
Kazakhstan? Precisely because it is one of the few Turkic states where the Turkish lobby
has little influence and faces little threat, due to proximity, and Kurds can enjoy the
privileges of minority protections in Kazakhstan that do not exist in almost any of the
post-Soviet states (Müller 2010).
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that ethnic inclusion leads to ethnic
harmony and less conflict. This is because institutional representation of ethnic minorities
addresses their grievances. As exhibited in Kazakhstan, proper measures to address
ethnic minority rights can mitigate the possibility of conflict altogether. In sharp contrast,
Azerbaijan has restricted minority rights, which has coincided with inter-ethnic war with
Armenia, pogroms targeting Armenians, desecration of cemeteries, linguistic
discrimination, deportation of Kurds, and the suppression of Lezgin & Talysh national
movements. The presence of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan ensures harmony
and representation between ethnic groups. Furthermore, it protects, promotes and
encourages minority languages, enabling them to be taught in schools and used openly
without discrimination. The APK in Kazakhstan serves as a model for other developing
countries struggling with ethnic conflict. Better policies aimed at ethnic inclusion and
accommodation will lead to more harmony. The research & data indicates that even
powerful forces like the resource curse – that is, the abundance of oil, does not ensure a
decrease in the risk of ethnic conflict. But even in the case of Azerbaijan, there is a clear
absence of an apparatus, mechanism or provisional law that protects, represents and
preserves the rights of ethnic minorities. It is no surprise that post-Soviet states have
carried on authoritarian traditions, but some have clearly managed them better than
others, albeit imperfectly. Beginning with the Nagorno-Karabakh war & the coup d’etat,
it became clear that Azerbaijan would take a much more radical course than its postSoviet counterpart, Kazakhstan. Even Turkmenistan, rich with oil, exhibits high levels of
stability despite the existence of minority ethnic groups. The ethnocentric character of
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Azerbaijan’s state is thus distinct. An ongoing war such as Nagorno-Karabakh, an
imperial past such as the USSR’s legacy, nor oil abundance (rentier state or resource
curse), prove to be nearly as statistically significant as ethnic exclusion in determining the
likelihood of ethnic violence, as demonstrated by Wimmer et al.
The persistence of SADVAL, listed as a terrorist organization by Azeri
authorities; Lezgin & Talysh minority rights national liberation movements; as well as
increases in political prisoners denote the ethnic inequality inherent in Azerbaijani
society and state.
Just recently, Azerbaijan’s neighbor and gravest threat, Armenia, also a new,
post-Soviet republic, experienced a successful revolution that overthrew a
democratically-elected-leader-turned-dictator. He was attempting to exploit the transition
from presidential rule to parliamentary rule as ploy to extend or altogether abolish
executive term limits as was done recently in Turkey – in that case, the head of state was
shifting from parliamentary to presidential. These developments in nearby Armenia pose
a threat to the durability of the authoritarian Azeri state. Furthermore, it gives legitimacy
to minority grievances on an international level. If minority protections, provisions and
rights existed for Armenian, Kurdish, Lezgin & Talysh communities, among others,
Azerbaijan could have avoided a war over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is clearly Armenian
by demography. Azerbaijan could have avoided marginalizing ethnic communities to
such extents that they form nationalist movements demanding rights and in some cases
territorial claims. Lastly ethnic minorities might not have suffered campaigns of violence,
particularly the Armenian community, which today is practically inexistent in Azerbaijan
as a result of the infamous Baku Pogrom.
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The ethnocentric and authoritarian character of the Azerbaijani state renders it
vulnerable to the Turkish lobby, which regards the grievances of Kurds and Armenians
equally threatening to its preeminence. The suggestion of a religious or territorial
dimension to the tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenians carries little weight given
the history & demography – Stalin made sure to create territorial problems for minorities
across borders; Nagorno-Karabakh is 98% Armenian, and yet remains under the auspices
of the Azerbaijani state.
The presence of Lezgins in the north, Talysh in the south, and Artsakh in the west
presents Azerbaijan with an interestingly significant minority that could challenge the
very ethnocentric character of the state. This would fundamentally reshape society and
the power balance shared by Azerbaijani elites and minority ethnic groups. On the other
hand, Kazakhstan, despite its democratic setbacks, stands a beacon of ethnic tolerance,
inclusion and harmony. There is no active ethnic terror group; nor any record of an ethnic
terrorist attack in the country’s history. The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan serves
as a role model of ethnic inclusion for both developing and developed countries,
including the United States and Turkey, both of which struggle with ethnic minority
issues. Ultimately the dynamics in both the two Caspian states differ according to their
degree of ethnic inclusion and accommodations for ethnic minorities.
This research posits that the establishment of a legislative body that
proportionally represents and preserves the rights of ethnic minorities is necessary to
function as a mechanism for inducing inter—ethnic harmony and national unity. Such
provisions reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict. It simultaneously increases regime
durability and helps a state further along its path towards ethnic inclusion and harmony.
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